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State-led gentrification and self-respect 
 




Gentrification is likely to be a familiar process to any city-dweller.1  A once-deprived area sees the 
entry of more affluent residents – artists first, perhaps, seeking low rents, then professionals with 
higher incomes. Investment increases, and the area undergoes a physical transformation.  The 
hipster coffee-shop arrives.  Rents rise, and the original residents of the area struggle to remain. 
 This process is, today, a global and highly controversial issue. Closely associated with cities 
(traditionally with cities such as New York, London, Paris, Toronto and San Francisco), it is the 
focus of widespread criticism and resistance by those who object to rising housing costs and the 
displacement of the original residents from their neighbourhoods.   Gentrification, however, has 
both academic and popular defenders, for whom it represents a process of positive change.2 
 Gentrification processes are popular subject-matter in geography, sociology and urban 
studies. Normative political theory, however, has been much slower to take up the question of 
what, if any, justice-based complaint those affected by gentrification might have.3  The aim of the 
present paper is to contribute to the small existing normative literature with an account of what 
can be troubling about what the wider literature calls “state-led” gentrification processes, processes 
in which the state, “actively seeks to promote and support gentrification,” often “in tandem with 
developers.”4  Recent research has pointed to the fact that gentrification processes are being used 
																																																						
1 Thank you to Emily McTernan, Kieran Oberman, Tom Parr and the audience at the Society for Applied 
Philosophy Annual Conference 2019 for comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as to two anonymous 
reviewers for this journal, for extremely helpful comments on the present version. 
2 See, for example, “In praise of gentrification,” The Economist, 21 June 2018, available at 
https://www.economist.com/united-states/2018/06/21/in-praise-of-gentrification; accessed 24 January 2019. For 
examples of academic defenders of gentrification see J. Peter Byrne, “Two Cheers for Gentrification,” Howard Law 
Journal 46:3 (2003): 405-432 and Jon Caulfield, “Gentrification and desire,” Canadian Review of Sociology and 
Anthropology 26:4 (1989): 617-632. 
3 This is not to say that scholars in geography, sociology and urban studies have not been critical of gentrification 
processes. For a highly influential critical work on gentrification, see Neil Smith, Gentrification and the Revanchist 
City (London: Routledge, 1996). 
4 Mark Davidson and Loretta Lees, “New-build ‘gentrification’ and London's Riverside Renaissance,” Environment 
and Planning A: Economy and Space 37:7 (2005), 1168. Italics omitted. This makes “state-led gentrification” 
something of a misnomer, since to “promote and support” is not necessarily to lead.  In the following paper, 
however, I continue to use this term, following the wider literature. Thank you to an anonymous reviewer for raising 
this point. 
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by policy-makers in many parts of the world as tools for urban ‘renewal’ or transformation.5  
However, it is claimed that this is often at the cost of badly off residents of these areas.  Here, I 
argue that where the state “actively seeks to promote and support” gentrification processes that 
(a) impose non-trivial costs on badly off residents of gentrifying areas, or (b) fail to benefit these 
residents in certain ways, the state disrespects these residents by expressing a troubling lack of 
regard for their interests. In doing so, it threatens their self-respect. Having made this argument, I 
also consider how certain kinds of state investment once gentrification processes have occurred 
can threaten the self-respect of original residents. 
 The central existing view of what is troubling about gentrification processes is supplied by 
the occupancy rights account.6  This account tells us that gentrification processes, state supported 
or not, are troubling insofar as they violate occupancy rights, the rights that individuals have to 
remain in a specific geographic location.  Before setting out my own account, I will briefly discuss 
the limitations of the occupancy rights analysis. 
 
2. Gentrification and state-led gentrification   
The aim of the present paper is to contribute an account of what is troubling about state-led 
gentrification. To do this, we first need a definition of gentrification.  A standard or classical 
definition of gentrification can be given along the following lines: “the transformation of a 
working-class or vacant area of the central city into middle-class residential and/ or commercial 
use.”7   
 The kind of gentrification processes I wish to discuss here, however, are more narrowly 
defined than this.  First, they are processes that occur in urban neighbourhoods that are not merely 
working class, but which have experienced decline or disinvestment and which are characterised 
by “physical deterioration” and “concentrations of poverty.”8   Some in the geography, sociology 
and urban studies literature understand gentrification as a process which, by definition, occurs in 
such areas – thus, it seems, rejecting the standard definition.  I will not here take a stance on issues 
of definition. I will talk broadly about “gentrification processes” and “gentrification,” but mean, 
																																																						
5 See, for example, Mark Davidson, “Spoiled Mixture: Where Does State-led ‘Positive’ Gentrification End?”, Urban 
Studies 45:12 (2008): 2385–2405. 
6 Jakob Huber and Fabio Wolkenstein, “Gentrification and Occupancy Rights,” Politics, Philosophy & Economics 
17:4 (2018): 378-397.  A further major account of the wrong of gentrification in political theory comes from 
Margaret Kohn, who argues that those in gentrifying areas should be viewed as in possession of involuntary 
expensive tastes.  I do not discuss this view here as it relies on the acceptance of a controversial version of luck 
egalitarianism according to which people ought to be compensated for their involuntary expensive tastes if they 
would not be able to reach the same levels of well-being as others without such compensation.  See Kohn, The 
Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), Ch. 5. 
7 Loretta Lees, Tom Slater and Elvin Wyley, Gentrification (New York: Routledge, 2008), xv. 
8 Miriam Zuk, Ariel H. Bierbaum, Karen Chapple et al., “Gentrification, Displacement and the Role of Public 
Investment,” Journal of Planning Literature 33:1 (2018), 32. 
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by those terms, gentrification processes that occur in areas that are badly off in the respects 
described above. The fact that some gentrification scholars argue that we ought to define 
gentrification as a process occurring in deprived areas, however, ought to reassure the reader that 
by focussing on this kind of gentrification, I am not focussing only on a very niche or marginal 
kind of gentrification. 
 Gentrification has traditionally been associated with the activities of private individuals, 
specifically middle-class people who move into a deprived or working-class area and buy and 
renovate housing in that area.  However, more recent research has pointed to the extent of state 
involvement in present-day gentrification processes and, specifically, to the phenomenon of “state-
led” gentrification. “State-led” gentrification here describes cases in which, on one recent 
definition, local and national government “actively seeks to promote and support gentrification,” 
often “in tandem with developers.”9 State-led gentrification has been widely documented in, 
amongst other places, the UK, the US, the Netherlands and Spain.10  This kind of gentrification is 
often framed as a way of pursuing policies of urban “renewal” aimed at transforming once-
deprived areas of cities.11  However, there is concern about the effect such policies have on the 
original residents of these areas, who are displaced or whose interests are otherwise set back.12  In 
what follows, I will offer an account which tells us when such state-led gentrification should be 
considered troubling.  
 It will be useful to highlight three further aspects of present-day gentrification processes, 
for the purposes of the present discussion.  First, gentrification is often understood as involving 
changes to the racial composition of an area and particularly, in places like the US, the influx of 
white residents into formerly black areas.13 Second, gentrification is typically taken to involve 
physical changes to the area in question. These, most importantly for the argument to follow, 
include improvements in infrastructure, services and amenities,14 and changes to the available 
housing stock (in particular, the loss of social or affordable housing, and its replacement with more 
																																																						
9 Mark Davidson and Loretta Lees, “New-build ‘gentrification’ and London's Riverside Renaissance,” Environment 
and Planning A: Economy and Space 37:7 (2005), 1168. Italics omitted.  
10 Jackson Hackworth and Neil Smith, “The changing state of gentrification,” Tijdschrift voor Economische en 
Sociale Geografie 92:4 (2001): 464-477; Rowland Atkinson, “The Evidence on the Impact of Gentrification: new 
lessons for the urban renaissance,” European Journal of Housing Policy 4:1 (2004): 107-131; Reinout Kleinhans, 
“Displaced but still moving upwards in the housing career? Implications of forced residential relocation in the 
Netherlands,” Housing Studies 18:4 (2003): 473-499; Lorenzo Vicario and P. Manuel Martı´nez Monje, “Another 
‘Guggenheim effect’? The generation of a potentially gentrifiable neighbourhood in Bilbao,” Urban Studies 40:12 
(2003): 2383-2400. 
11 Davidson, “Spoiled Mixture”; Rowland Atkinson, “The Evidence on the Impact of Gentrification: New Lessons 
for the Urban Renaissance,” European Journal of Housing Policy 4:1 (2004): 107–131 
12 See, for instance, Atkinson, “The Evidence on the Impact of Gentrification.” 
13 See Jacob L. Vigdor, Douglas S. Massey and Alice M. Rivlin, “Does Gentrification Harm the Poor? [with 
Comments],” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Urban Affairs (2002), 138. 
14 Zuk, Bierbaum and Chapple. 
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expensive dwellings).15 Finally, as well as the state acting to promote and support gentrification, it 
may also engage in certain kinds of downstream investment into areas once gentrification 
processes are underway, for instance providing better funding to local services post-gentrification. 
This downstream state investment is something I will discuss further below. 
 
3. Occupancy Rights 
Before setting out my own account, I wish to briefly comment on a prominent existing account 
of the wrong of gentrification: the occupancy rights account.16 Since this account is not a rival to 
my own (we might hold that state-led gentrification can be troubling because it violates occupancy 
rights, and because it threatens self-respect), I will not engage in a very lengthy discussion of this 
view.  However, I do want to point, as a way of motivating an alternative account, to the limitations 
of a view that seeks to explain the wrong of gentrification in this way. 
 The idea of occupancy rights emerges in work diagnosing the wrong of territorial removals, 
such as the removal of the Navajo Indians from Arizona.17  These rights are ones that we are taken 
to possess on the basis that our life-plans are often located, that is, rooted in a particular place.  If 
we are moved far away from the place where we currently live, we will typically lose access to 
central aspects of these life-plans: our economic practices, our social networks, the cultural and 
religious organisations to which we belong,18 all of which are “intertwined” with a particular place.19 
In losing access to the central parts of our life-plans, our flourishing, which depends on the success 
of these life-plans, is seriously endangered.20 Our interest in retaining access to the central aspects 
of our plans and projects grounds two occupancy rights, as follows: (1) the liberty to reside 
permanently in a particular space, and/ or to make use of that area for social, cultural, and 
economic practices and (2) a claim against others not to remove one from the area and not to 
interfere with one’s use of that space in ways that undermine the shared social practices in which 
one is engaged.21 
																																																						
15 Huber and Wolkenstein, 380. 
16 A recently published account of the wrong of gentrification argues that gentrification is troubling because it 
involves domination. I am not able to discuss this paper here, but I take it that the account I go on to defend will 
appeal to those who are critical or sceptical of the neo-republican approach. See Daniel Putnam, “Gentrification and 
Domination,” Journal of Political Philosophy 2020, Online Early View. 
17 See Anna Stilz “Occupancy Rights and the Wrong of Removal,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 41:4 (2013): 324–
356 and Territorial Occupancy: A Philosophical Exploration (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019). The authors 
of the occupancy rights account of gentrification draw primarily on Stilz, but see also Margaret Moore, A Political 
Theory of Territory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). 
18 Stilz, “Occupancy Rights and the Wrong of Removal,” 338. 
19 Huber and Wolkenstein, 382. 
20 Ibid., 383. 
21 I reproduce these rights verbatim from Huber & Wolkenstein, 383. 
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 Drawing on the occupancy rights framework, Huber and Wolkenstein, who defend the 
occupancy rights approach to gentrification, defend a right, on the part of city-dwellers, against 
expulsion.  This is a “plan-based” right “to remain in the neighborhood where their social, cultural, 
and economic practices are located, which goes some way in protecting them from being ‘priced 
out’ of it.”22  Respect for this right requires city authorities or the state to enact measures such as 
rent-control, to prevent gentrification-induced displacement from city neighbourhoods.  City-
dwellers are also to be given enhanced democratic rights over their neighbourhoods, to help 
protect from the loss of access to social, cultural, and economic practices that comes along with 
gentrification-induced transformation of the neighbourhood in which these practices are located.23 
 One way of reading Huber and Wolkenstein here is as claiming that all city dwellers have 
occupancy rights, including the “plan-based” right, with respect to their neighbourhoods.  To do 
this, however, would be to attribute to them a relatively unpersuasive view, since to ground such 
rights one would have to claim that all city-dwellers have social, cultural, and economic practices 
located within their neighbourhoods and would lose access to these if they were displaced from 
those neighbourhoods.  This, however, seems implausible to claim of many city-dwellers, who 
might work in one part of the city, live in another, and socialise in yet another. Cities, indeed, might 
precisely seem to make this way of living possible for those with the means and the opportunity.  
Another, and I think the correct, way of reading them is as claiming that insofar as a city-dweller 
has projects that are tightly located in a particular neighbourhood, and would lose access to these 
if they were displaced from this neighbourhood, they have a right against expulsion from this 
neighbourhood.   On this kind of view, occupancy rights vary in scope from person to person,24 
and only some have neighbourhood-specific rights.  
 On this reading, Huber and Wolkenstein must ground the anti-gentrification measures 
they want by arguing that those whose plight we are normally concerned with when it comes to 
gentrification, that is, the badly off, typically would lose access to their social, cultural and 
economic practices if they were removed from their neighbourhoods. Huber and Wolkenstein 
argue that this is the case: badly-off city-dwellers tend to have practices, particularly social and 
cultural practices, that are locally-based. This may be because they lack the financial means to travel 
widely and because in the context of poverty and disadvantage, local community is often thought 
to gain greater importance, in part because it functions as a support network.25  In contrast, the 
																																																						
22 Ibid, 384. 
23 Ibid., pp. 390-92. 
24 Margaret Moore notes that this is a feature of Stilz’s account of occupancy rights, and also notes that this is an 
unusual feature of a rights-based account. See her “Occupancy rights: life planners and the Navajos,” Critical 
Review of Social and Political Philosophy 23(6): 757–764. 
25 Huber and Wolkenstein, 385. 
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wealthier individual, Huber and Wolkenstein argue, may be more resilient in the face of 
displacement from their neighbourhood, because their resources mean that displacement does not 
cut them off from their life-plans.26  These individuals are, therefore, less likely to be able to make 
claims on the state on the basis of displacement, even if this results (as it sometimes does) from 
being priced out of their area.27 
 If we accept that the account is of this structure (which, based on Huber and Wolkenstein’s 
text, I think we should) then this account issues in the following conclusion: if gentrification-
induced displacement (or transformation) does not result in a badly-off individual losing access to 
his social, economic and cultural practices, then it follows that this individual – like the wealthy 
person who is displaced – has little complaint about such processes.28  For Huber and Wolkenstein, 
then, one’s rootedness in one’s locality is the primary basis for complaint about gentrification 
processes. In creating this kind of account, they (as they state) are responding to a large public 
discourse around gentrification that sees gentrification as troubling because it destroys 
communities, and because it displaces people from locations with which their identities are, in 
various ways, tied up.  However, this is only one way of thinking about gentrification, and other 
voices from gentrifying communities (some of which I will discuss later on in the paper) indicate 
that this is not the only important basis for complaint.  In the rest of the paper, I will offer an 
account that allows that even for those with little attachment to or rootedness in their local area – 
even the socially isolated or withdrawn individual, say, or the individual who lives in a bad 
neighbourhood because it is all they can afford, who commutes far (as many badly-off people do) 
to work and whose family live in another party of the city – may nevertheless have a complaint 
about gentrification processes. 
 
4. Self-respect 
Much has been written on the importance of self-respect.  Rawls, famously, refers to it as “perhaps 
the most important primary good”; without it, he argues, we cannot hope to advance our plans 
and projects.29 The parties in the original position must, therefore, ensure that the conditions for 




28 This individual may still be protected by general anti-gentrification policies, if these are justified by the majority’s 
situation, but my concern here is about their basis, as an individual, for complaint. 
29 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. ed. (Harvard University Press, 1999), 386. 
30 Joshua Cohen, “Democratic Equality,” Ethics 99: 4 (1989): 727-751   
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 It is common in the literature on self-respect to draw a distinction between “recognition” 
or “standing” self-respect, on the one hand, and “evaluative” self-respect on the other.31  The latter 
idea of self-respect, which has to do with the extent to which an individual meets the standards 
she has set for herself, will not concern us here.  When an individual possesses the former type of 
self-respect – recognition or standing self-respect – she has a proper sense of (a) her own worth 
and status; (b) the kind of treatment she is entitled to, and the kind of responsibilities she has, on 
this basis.  The word “proper,” here, is important.  To have recognition self-respect in the sense 
meant here, an individual’s understanding of her own worth and status must be correct, as must 
her understanding of the kinds treatment to which she is entitled, and the kinds of responsibilities 
she bears.  An important aspect of self-respect is that an individual understands her worth and 
status as equal to that of all other persons.32 In the context of this paper, our interest will be in the 
individual’s sense of her own worth and status as equal to others in the political community, and 
the treatment from the state and from others in this community (and responsibilities towards 
them) that is taken to follow from this.   
 One significant aspect of an individual’s proper sense of her own worth and status relative 
to others is her proper sense of her own agency. This is understood here in Rawlsian terms as her 
sense that she is someone capable of forming and carrying out a conception of the good, or plan 
of life, and that she is entitled to certain kinds of treatment by others on the basis of this capacity.33  
Identifying this aspect of the individual’s self-respect helps us to understand one reason why 
recognition self-respect is so important, because (correctly) understanding oneself as in possession 
of a particular capacity (in this case, the capacity to form and pursue a plan of life) enables one to 
exercise that capacity with confidence.34  This, however, is not the only value of recognition self-
respect.  As others have pointed out, possessing a proper sense of one’ own worth in relation to 
others enables an individual to engage in personal relationships with others on equal terms, and 
helps protect her from certain kinds of interpersonal subordination.35 Thus, self-respect helps the 
individual exercise her associative freedoms with confidence.  In addition, some argue (although 
this argument may not be of much interest to political liberals) that it is intrinsically valuable for 
																																																						
31 This distinction originates in Stephen L. Darwall, “Two Kinds of Respect,” Ethics 88:1 (1977): 36-49. See also 
Robin S. Dillon, “How to Lose Your Self-Respect,” American Philosophical Quarterly 29:2 (1992), esp. pp. 133-134. 
32 Dillon, “How to Lose Your Self-Respect,” 133. 
33 Here, and in my arguments below, I draw on Krishnamurthy’s discussion of Rawls and self-respect.  Meena 
Krishnamurthy, “Completing Rawls's arguments for equal political liberty and its fair value: the argument from self-
respect,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43:2 (2013): 179-205. Non-Rawlsian accounts of recognition self-respect 
also emphasise the importance of an individual’s proper sense of their own agency. See, for example, Dillon, “How 
to Lose Your Self-Respect.” 
34 Christian Schemmel, “Real self-respect and its social bases,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49:5 (2019), 635. 
35 Thomas E. Hill, Jr., "Servility and Self-Respect," The Monist 57:1 (1973): 87-104  
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individuals to have recognition self-respect, since to have recognition self-respect is to correctly 
value that which is, in fact, valuable – for instance, human agency.36   
 
5. State support for gentrification  
The arguments that follow are divided into two parts.  In this section, I will argue that where the 
state actively “seeks to promote and support” gentrification processes that either (a) impose non-
trivial costs on badly off residents of gentrifying areas, or (b) fail to benefit these residents in 
certain ways, then the state disrespects these residents by expressing a troubling disregard for their 
interests, and threatens their self-respect.  In the next, I offer an argument which links what I have 
called down-stream state investment into gentrifying areas to a threat to the self-respect of original 
residents.  
 In making the arguments of this paper, I am accepting what is sometimes called the 
“dependency thesis” about self-respect, the idea that the individual’s self-respect is in important 
ways dependent on the kind of treatment that she receives from others.37  What it means to secure 
the general social conditions that support self-respect (self-respect’s “social bases,” in Rawlsian 
terms) is therefore to ensure that individuals are treated in the appropriate way.  This “dependency 
thesis,” or specific versions of it, have recently been criticised, but I set aside discussion of these 
criticisms until later in the paper.38 It should be said, however, that for those readers who are 
strongly convinced at this stage of the paper that these criticisms have bite, or who reject the claims 
made above significance of individual self-respect, as it is characterised here, the arguments made 
in the present section of the paper can run another way.  This is that in actively pursuing 
gentrification processes the state disrespects the original residents of gentrifying areas.  For the 
state to disrespect these residents, in the sense of expressing a view that is inconsistent with the 
self-respecting person’s proper view of their own worth and status, is in itself deeply troubling.  In 
my view, understanding things only in terms of disrespect offers us a diminished analysis that 
neglects the importance of individual self-respect; nevertheless, this part of the argument will go 
through without reference to self-respect. 
 Why, then, might state support for gentrification processes be thought to disrespect the 
original residents of gentrifying areas, and threaten their recognition self-respect?  Here, I offer 
two different lines of argument for this conclusion. 
(1) The first argument claims that state-led gentrification disrespects the original residents 
of gentrifying areas, and threatens their self-respect, where it imposes certain non-trivial costs on 
																																																						
36 Dillon, “How to lose your self-respect.” 
37 Colin Bird, “Self-Respect and the Respect of Others,” European Journal of Philosophy 18:1 (2010): 17–40. 
38 Bird, “Self-Respect”; Schemmel, “Real self-respect.” 
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those residents.  To begin the argument, then, I want to highlight three kinds of costs or burden 
to original residents which are commonly associated with gentrification processes in the existing 
literature on gentrification, which are not merely trivial. The first cost or burden is displacement.  
The displacement of the original residents of gentrifying areas is one of the most commonly noted 
negative consequences of gentrification processes.  It is predictable that those who are displaced 
by gentrification processes will suffer certain costs in the course of displacement.  These include 
the upheaval associated with moving to a different part of the city, or out of the city altogether, 
the costs associated with settling into a new area, the loss (perhaps) of some of their social network. 
The costs may, in certain cases, be much more significant than this.  Gentrification is associated 
with an increase in homelessness, as some of those who are displaced as a result of rising housing 
costs fail to find alternative accommodation.  If we view individuals as having a basic right to 
housing then the costs of gentrification for some include the subversion of one of their basic 
rights.  For the displaced who are not rendered homeless, but who simply find housing in a 
different area of the city, there are still costs which will typically have some negative impact on the 
individual’s ability to carry out their plans and projects, since this is the effect that upheaval tends 
to have, requiring us, at the very least, to bear the financial costs associated with upheaval (reducing 
the resources we have available for our plans and projects) and to focus on negotiating the 
upheaval, and re-establishing our lives in a new place, rather than carrying out our plans and 
projects.39 
Note, here that claiming that we are concerned about gentrification on the basis that it has 
some (non-trivial) negative impact on or in a non-trivial way sets back the individual’s ability to 
pursue their life-plans is different from claiming (as proponents of the occupancy rights account 
do) that we are concerned about gentrification insofar as it undermines access to elements of the 
individual’s life-plans, such as their economic practices.  This is, first, because our life-plans may 
be set back in other ways than by losing access to the central elements defenders of the occupancy 
rights account discuss.40  Second, defenders of the occupancy rights account are primarily 
concerned with the individual’s access to these elements being undermined,41 rather than with less 
significant harms. 
 A concern might be raised here that the question of whether gentrification displaces the 
original residents of gentrifying areas is not settled in the empirical literature on gentrification. 
																																																						
39 For an argument that displacement from one’s home involves harm to our cognitive functioning, see Cara Nine, 
“The Wrong of Displacement: The Home as Extended Mind,” The Journal of Political Philosophy 26:2 (2018): 240-
257.  My argument here does not rely on the success of this kind of argument. 
40 Nine makes this point in “The Wrong of Displacement.” 
41 See, for instance, Huber and Wolkenstein, 386. 
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Rather surprisingly, given the persistent connection between gentrification and displacement in 
public discourse, some studies cast doubt on whether there is a significant relationship between 
gentrification and displacement, at least in certain locations.42  One response to this concern is to 
point out that my argument here only claims that where state-supported gentrification sets back the 
interests of the badly off, it disrespects these individuals.  What is being offered are the tools with 
which we can judge whether state support for gentrification is troubling. However, there are also 
reasons not to be too quick to accept the conclusions of those who rule out the connection 
between gentrification and displacement.  One plausible explanation for why some existing studies 
fail to find a relationship between relationship and displacement is that the time frame of such 
studies is not long enough to capture the relevant displacement.43 Original residents will typically 
attempt to remain in a gentrifying area to take advantage of the benefits of doing so, in spite of 
the rising costs. Eventually, however, these costs will become too great, prompting a move.44   
 The second cost or burden associated with gentrification relates to the residents just 
mentioned who try to remain in gentrifying areas in order to take advantage of the benefits of 
doing so.  Let us call these precarious residents because such residents absorb the higher costs of 
remaining in the area in a way that will be unsustainable in the long-term, because of their income 
levels.45  For those who remain in a particular area in a precarious way, the costs are slightly 
different to those borne by the displaced.  These comprise, in the main, the cost to the individual’s 
ability to carry out their plans and projects of insecurity. If the precarious individual’s mental 
energy is focussed, to some extent, on her precarity, rather than her plans and projects, and because 
she has little sense of how long she may remain in a particular area (this is different from knowing 
that one will not be in a particular area for very long), this restricts her ability to plan. 
 The final cost or burden is associated with those original residents who remain in 
gentrifying areas without their situation in terms of income being improved.  These are the 
aforementioned precarious residents, but also some of those who may remain more securely, for 
instance some social housing tenants in the UK.  For these individuals, the cost or burden in 
question is the loss of appropriate services.46 As areas come to house wealthier populations, the 
																																																						
42 The most prominent work questioning the relationship between displacement and gentrification is Lance Freeman 
and Frank Braconi, Gentrification and Displacement New York City in the 1990s.” Journal of the American 
Planning Association 70:1 (2004): 39–52. 
43 Zuk, Bierbaum and Chapple, 37. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Some residents of gentrifying areas are rendered precarious for other reasons, for instance because (in the UK) 
their social housing is scheduled for demolition, and they have not yet been rehoused.  See Jessica Brown, “'I only 
plan for now': the people whose estates are being torn down around them,” The Guardian, 21 November 2019, 
available at https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2019/nov/21/i-only-plan-for-now-the-people-whose-estates-are-
being-torn-down-around-them; accessed 9th December 2019. 
46 Rowland Atkinson, “The hidden costs of gentrification: Displacement in central London,” Journal of Housing 
and the Built Environment 15 (2000): 307–326. 
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services catering to the original, less well off, population may disappear.  By ‘services’ here is meant 
both appropriate (in this case affordable) shops and amenities (such as pubs and bars), and public 
services, for instance libraries and leisure centres, and support services.  The loss of these things 
will, again, affect the individual’s ability to carry out their plans and projects within their means, as 
will (of course) the loss of support services.  
 Where the residents of gentrifying areas suffer these costs or burdens as a consequence of 
state promotion of or support for gentrification, why should we view them as disrespected by the 
state?  Let me begin by re-iterating that the original residents under discussion are disadvantaged 
individuals.  This means that these individuals already have very limited resources, and fewer 
resources than others in the political community, to devote to their plans and projects.  If the state 
viewed the agency interests of all citizens as of equal importance, we might think that it would be 
concerned to act in ways that promoted, rather than set back, the interests of those who were 
already disadvantaged with respect to their interest in forming and pursuing a conception of the 
good.47  Where, however, it instead actively pursues a process which sets back the interests of these 
individuals, it conveys or expresses to them a troubling lack of respect for their interests, and 
particularly for their interest in forming and pursuing a conception of the good.48  Since our 
recognition of our capacity for agency is (as argued above) part of recognizing our own worth, a 
state which expresses a view that the agency of some is not important, fails to properly recognise 
the worth of those citizens.  The state thus expresses disrespect for the original residents of 
gentrifying areas, and this expression of disrespect constitutes a threat to these individuals’ self-
respect. 
In addition, gentrification processes often benefit wealthier citizens, who move into 
gentrifying areas in order to access cheaper housing, and in order to be able to enjoy the dynamic 
environment, services and so on to be found in ‘up and coming’ areas. Insofar as the state actively 
pursues a process that results in the interests of the already badly off being set back and the interests 
of the better off being enhanced, and further, encourages a process in which it is the displacement 
of the worst off that may allow for the wealthier to have their interests enhanced (since as original 
residents leave wealthier residents may move in), the state conveys or expresses a view about the 
relative importance of its citizens’ plans and projects, namely that it is the plans and projects of 
																																																						
47 Again, here I am drawing on Krishnamurthy’s discussion of self-respect and agency. Krishnamurthy, “Completing 
Rawls's arguments.” 
48 Here my account echoes an observation made by Spencer and Powell that gentrification involves “a double insult-
a "one-two" knock-out” where (on their account) the double insult is to non-white urban dwellers, with the first 
insult understood as white flight, which caused certain neighbourhoods to become ‘isolated and undervalued’ and 
the second gentrification. See John A. Powell and Marguerite Spencer, “Giving Them the Old One-two: 
Gentrification and the K.O. of Impoverished Urban Dwellers of Color,” Howard Law Journal 46:433 (2002), 437. 
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wealthier citizens that are to be considered of greater importance.  Again, since our recognition of 
our capacity for agency is (as argued above) part of recognizing our own worth, a state which 
expresses the view that the agency of some citizens is less important than the agency of others fails 
to express a view of citizens as having equal status or worth. The state thus expresses disrespect 
for the original residents of gentrifying areas, and this expression of disrespect constitutes a threat 
to these individuals’ self-respect. 
In recent work Elizabeth Brake offers arguments that also connect concerns about 
gentrification to the setting-back of the life-plans of the badly off.49 She, too, points to the upheaval 
and disruption that gentrification-induced displacement engenders. Brake’s account differs from 
the one just offered, however, in at least two respects.  First, her focus is not on state-led 
gentrification. Second, she argues that liberal egalitarians ought to be concerned about these effects 
on the basis that they conflict with commitment to an equality of opportunity principle rather than 
because (as I have argued) where the state supports policies that have these effects, it threatens 
self-respect.  The discussion of gentrification in terms of self-respect helps to underscore the 
damaging nature of state support for gentrification, in threatening citizens’ sense of worth and 
status.50 
Let me respond to several concerns that might be raised about the argument I have just 
set out.51  First, it might be argued that the state disrespects citizens, in the context of gentrification, 
even when it does not actively pursue, or explicitly support, gentrification processes.  Indeed, we 
may argue that if the state fails to intervene in gentrification processes that set back the interests 
of those who are already disadvantaged, then it disrespects these individuals, by expressing a lack 
of concern for their agency. The claim, then, is that the argument from self-respect has much 
broader implications than I acknowledge.  
It is certainly true that the state can disrespect its citizens in other ways than by actively 
promoting and supporting gentrification.  One way is that it allows them to become, and remain, 
badly off in certain respects in the first place.  Another way, just highlighted, is that it fails to 
intervene in gentrification processes that set back their interests.  Nevertheless, I want to maintain 
here that there is something additionally disrespectful about state-led gentrification, that explains 
why we should be particularly troubled by this phenomenon.  Here, the state actively signs up in 
																																																						
49 See Brake, “Rebuilding after Disaster: Inequality and the Political Importance of Place,” Social Theory and 
Practice 45:2 (2019), 189. 
50 In making these claims, what I argue here is closer to important recent work on racial profiling, which holds that 
profiling is wrong because it causes black and AMEMSA individuals to have a reasonable sense of inferior political 
status, in a context in which their interests are already disregarded.  See Adam Omar Hosein, “Racial Profiling and a 
Reasonable Sense of Inferior Political Status,” Journal of Political Philosophy 26:3 (2018): e-1-e20. 
51 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising these concerns. 
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support of a process that sets back its own citizens’ interests, interests for which it has already shown 
a troubling disregard.  In doing so, it expresses a particularly profound, we might even say insulting, 
lack of regard or respect for those citizens and their interests. Thus, state-led gentrification poses 
an additional, and particularly serious, threat to citizens’ self-respect. 
A second concern relates to the reasons for which a state might actively pursue 
gentrification policies.  It might be objected that the argument I have set out above works best in 
cases in which the state can be clearly understood as pursuing the “renewal” or “improvement” of 
cities at the expense of badly-off residents of those cities.  However, states sometimes explicitly 
justify the pursuit of gentrification on the grounds that this will benefit the disadvantaged city 
dweller.  In the UK in the 1990s and 2000s, for instance, policy-makers justified the pursuit of 
gentrification on the grounds that “social mixing,” the introduction of better off residents into 
previously badly-off areas, would benefit the original residents of those areas.52 
It is important to note that the argument of the present section implies that where the state 
pursues gentrification policies and these policies do not set back the interests of those who are 
badly off, then the state does not, in pursuing these policies, disrespect the badly-off original 
residents of gentrifying areas.  In the context of the UK policies just mentioned, however, the 
situation is more complicated: some of the badly-off residents found that their interests were set 
back (since some were displaced), whilst others may have found their situation improved.53  In this 
case, it seems that we can still argue that the state disrespects or insults those badly-off residents 
who are, for instance, displaced, on the grounds that the state has actively pursued a process that 
has resulted in their interests being set back. 
However, this response may not seem entirely satisfactory.  What if the state had simply 
not anticipated that gentrification processes would have this effect? Asking this question reveals 
the extent to which the argument just set out relies on the idea that it is relatively predictable that 
these processes will negatively affect the badly off, unless there are various kinds of intervention 
put in place to prevent this (such as, for example, rent control). I am claiming that where the state 
can plausibly be expected to know in advance that gentrification processes will set back the 
interests of disadvantaged original residents, and actively pursues these policies anyway, it 
disrespects these residents.  In the context of recent and present-day gentrification, it is reasonable 
to assume that the state does know in advance what the likely outcomes of gentrification will be, 
																																																						
52 Loretta Lees, “Gentrification and Social Mixing: Towards an Inclusive Urban Renaissance?” Urban Studies 45:12 
(2008), esp. pp. 2452-2453. 
53 Ibid.  Although Lees notes that the evidence that ‘social mixing’ does benefit the badly off in the ways claimed by 
defenders of the policies in question is not that clear. 
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since gentrification and its effects on the already disadvantaged are widely discussed in the public 
sphere. 
Finally, the concern might be raised that we can imagine circumstances in which the state 
might be viewed as justified in pursuing a policy that predictably sets back the interests of the 
disadvantaged, given the importance of the goal in question, and the relationship that setting back 
the interests of the disadvantage has to the achievement of that goal (perhaps, it is a consequence 
that cannot be avoided).  In this case, it might be argued, state action is not disrespectful.  For the 
purposes of the present paper, however, I need not comment on such cases.  It is difficult to see 
gentrification as such a policy.  Even if the renewal or improvement of cities is an important goal 
that the state should seek to pursue, it is one that (as I will discuss further in section 7) can be 
pursued in a way that is consistent with protecting the interests of the disadvantaged. 
 
 (2) The second argument claims that state-led gentrification disrespects the original 
residents of gentrifying areas, and threatens their self-respect, where the state fails to ensure that 
original residents benefit in certain ways from gentrification.  For the purposes of this argument, 
and the argument relating to downstream state investment into gentrifying areas set out below, it 
will be necessary to introduce the idea of basic goods and their significance. 
 Certain goods are of fundamental importance to individuals. Call these “basic goods.”  
One such good is housing: if individuals are to form, revise and pursue their conception of the 
good, then access to decent housing is of great importance.  Other such goods are what I will call 
“environmental” goods: goods that relate to the individual’s direct physical environment.  It is 
important that an individual live in a neighbourhood or area that is decent, has safe, clean streets, 
and has reasonable services and amenities available, or, to put things another way, it is important 
that an individual live in a neighbourhood or area that is not dangerous or in disrepair, that is not 
lacking in basic amenities, and that does not suffer from what in the US is referred to as ‘blight’.  
The importance of individuals being provided with a decent environment can be related to the 
individual’s ability to carry out her life-plans.  For instance, it is clearly important for an individual’s 
life-plans that she is physically secure she is, and that she is aware that she is physically secure.  But 
it is also important for an individual’s life-plans that there be a reasonable quality of transport and 
amenities in her environment; that it is not too difficult to buy food and other essentials, to access 
leisure facilities, to move around, and so on.  
Areas in which gentrification occurs are, on the definition adopted in this paper, areas 
which have experienced “decline or disinvestment” and which are characterised by “physical 
deterioration” – areas, we can conclude, therefore, in which residents are not provided with many 
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of the relevant basic goods.  A recent article on gentrification in Pittsburgh, Atlanta in the US, for 
example, points to the extent to which the area had, prior to gentrification beginning, suffered 
from high levels of crime, vacant and poor-quality homes, and disinvestment.54  When 
gentrification occurs, there is an increase in investment into the area.  In the case of state-led 
gentrification, this is, in part, state investment.  But part of the aim of state-led gentrification is 
that state investment should trigger or accelerate gentrification processes that involve other kinds 
of investment, typically private individual investment, in the form of individuals improving the 
housing which they have purchased, and commercial investment, in the form of new businesses 
moving into the area, and new, more expensive housing and commercial developments being built. 
This increase in investment results in the relevant basic goods becoming available: gentrification 
is associated with better housing, infrastructure, services and amenities coming to a particular 
area.55 
 Whether the original residents benefit from these improvements in the area, in terms of 
gaining access to basic goods of a decent quality, depends on two things.  Firstly, that they are not 
displaced from the area in question. As previously noted, recent research has raised concerns that 
the ‘renewal’ or transformation pursued by policy-makers comes at the cost of the badly off 
residents of gentrifying areas, who (the concern is) end up being displaced from those areas when 
the cost of housing rises beyond what they can afford.  Secondly, that the improved basic goods 
which come to the area are those which these individuals are in fact able to access.  I am particularly 
thinking, here, of housing. Critics of gentrification point to the fact that the new housing that is 
built in gentrifying areas is often far out of the price range of the original residents of the 
gentrifying area. Elephant and Castle in London, for instance, has historically been a badly off area 
of the city, but is now rapidly gentrifying.  An “affordable” one-bedroom apartment in one of the 
new housing developments to be built in the area will cost £595,000.56 
 My claim here is that where the state actively seeks to promote or support gentrification, 
but does not put in place, or only puts in place very half-hearted measures to ensure that the 
original residents of gentrifying areas can gain access to the basic goods with which the area comes 
to be furnished, this disrespects the original residents.   Here, the state shows a troubling disregard 
for their access to the relevant basic goods.  For an example of a half-hearted measure, we might 
																																																						
54 James Lartey, “Nowhere for people to go: who will survive the gentrification of Atlanta?” The Guardian, 23 
October 2018, available at https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2018/oct/23/nowhere-for-people-to-go-who-will-
survive-the-gentrification-of-atlanta; accessed 7th December 2018. 
55 Note, however, that this does not mean that there is not a loss of some services, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
56 Antonia Cundy, “Elephant and Castle shifts from social housing to ‘build to rent’,” Financial Times, March 15 
2019, available at https://www.ft.com/content/ec2744d6-44b5-11e9-b168-96a37d002cd3; accessed 14th December 
2020. 
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use the kind of constraints that have in recent history been placed on London housing developers 
to ensure that some minimum proportion of the housing that they build should be affordable. 
Under the definition of “affordable” rental housing held by David Cameron’s government, this 
meant that the housing should cost no more to rent than 80% of the average local market rent – 
not, we might think, a cap that is likely to benefit poorer original residents of an area, if rents rise 
dramatically as a consequence of gentrification processes.  
It might be argued here that the state has already, by failing to provide the original residents 
of gentrifying areas with basic goods, showed disrespect to these individuals, and therefore 
threatened their self-respect.  It is not clear why a state’s actively promoting and supporting 
gentrification processes without making any serious attempt to ensure that original individuals 
benefit from these processes should be considered as an additional threat to their self-respect.  
However, on closer inspection, there is a distinct or additional threat to self-respect here.  The 
state acts to bring about a process of positive change in a particular area, and then shows itself to 
be uninterested in ensuring that those in the area most in need, those whom it has already 
neglected, benefit from this change. This is, surely, an additional blow to the self-respect of the 
already badly off. 
  
 
6. Self-respect and down-stream state investment 
I now turn to offer a final argument linking the state, gentrification and self-respect. 
Let me start with two quotations. One is from a resident of Pittsburgh, responding to the 
fact that certain changes to his local area (including new laminated bus timetables, and decorations 
in the main street) came only after gentrification processes were underway. “It hurts, to be quite 
honest,” he says. “It’s disappointing to see economic potential only thought to be real when other 
people come in, and not recognised for the culture that is already here.”57  The other is from 
filmmaker Spike Lee, describing the gentrification of Brooklyn, New York: 
 
“So, why did it take this great influx of white people to get the schools better? Why’s there more 
police protection in Bed Stuy and Harlem now? Why’s the garbage getting picked up more 
regularly? We been here!”58 
 
																																																						
57 Lartey, “Nowhere for people to go.” 
58 Chris Michael and Ellie Violet Bramley, “Spike Lee’s gentrification rant – transcript: ‘Fort Greene park is like the 
Westminster dog show,’” The Guardian, 26 February 2014, available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/feb/26/spike-lee-gentrification-rant-transcript; accessed 31 May 2019. 
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What I will say about gentrification and self-respect in what follows is to a significant extent an 
elaboration and explanation of these two statements. 
 The majority of this paper has concerned state-led gentrification. Here, I consider a slightly 
different phenomenon: state investment into an area after gentrification processes are already 
underway.  This, I take it, is what Lee and Cheers are referring to: improvements in various public 
services in the area that occur once gentrification processes are underway.  That these kinds of 
changes occur is reflected, for example, in work on gentrification from Freeman, in which residents 
of gentrifying areas of New York describe significant improvements in policing services in the 
area, after gentrification processes have begun.59 
 Gentrifying areas are those which, pre-gentrification, have been badly off, and are 
therefore likely to have lacked certain basic environmental goods: clean, safe streets, buildings in 
decent repair, and so on.  These are environmental goods that I have, above, associated with the 
protection of individuals’ interest in carrying out their plans and projects.  When state investment 
in an area to provide these goods only begins once gentrification processes are underway, that is, 
once people other than the original residents start living in the area in question, it would be 
reasonable for original residents to take it from these events that they (and perhaps more generally, 
people of their class, or race) are not viewed by the state as deserving of the relevant basic goods. 
This is a threat to their self-respect, since it implies that their interest in forming and carrying out 
their life-plans is not being weighed equally with the interests of others.  
 However, an immediate response to this argument might be the following.  Wouldn’t the 
original residents of gentrifying areas have been aware, prior to gentrification processes beginning, 
that whilst they lacked the relevant goods, others in the society in which they live were provided 
with them? There are plenty of ways in which they could have obtained this information, not least 
by travelling to wealthier areas. In what sense does downstream state investment further threaten 
or undermine the self-respect of original residents? 
 It does so, I think, by making clear that the differential provision is a type of unjust 
treatment. Part of this is eliminating alternative reasons for the differential treatment.  Where 
gentrification processes result in better services in that area, it makes very clear to original residents 
that these better services could, in fact, have been provided in their area – but were not provided 
whilst it was only the original residents living there. (So, the differential provision cannot be 
explained away on the basis of better provision being unachievable).  When gentrification occurs, 
original residents witness the same (for instance, local government) bodies that have failed to 
																																																						
59 Lance Freeman, There Goes the ’Hood: Views of Gentrification from the Ground Up (Philadelphia: Temple 
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provide them with the relevant services, such as adequate policing, provide those services to 
others. So, the differential provision is not down to different service providers.  Part of this, 
however, is that when services get better as a result of gentrification, original residents do not 
simply observe differences between provision in different areas, but witness a causal process by 
which the presence of other kinds of people results in better provision of certain services in their 
own area.60   This, I think, makes the injustice very clear. 
 
7. The upshot of the arguments 
What are the implications of the arguments set out above for state action with respect to 
gentrification? One important thing we will want to know is whether an implication of any of the 
arguments set out here is that states should not pursue policies of state-led gentrification. 
 The first argument, to recall, is that where the state encourages gentrification processes 
that imposes non-trivial costs on badly off residents of gentrifying areas, the state poses a 
particularly serious threat to their self-respect.  A central implication of this argument, then, is that 
the state can only act in support of gentrification processes in badly-off areas if it is prepared to 
ensure that the interests of original residents are not set back by these processes. The state should 
seek to ensure that original residents are not displaced, rendered precarious, or experience a loss 
of service provision.  Alternatively, the state ought to provide compensation for any non-trivial 
costs experienced by original residents.  
 The second argument is that where the state actively pursues gentrification processes that 
fail to benefit the original residents in certain ways, then the state again seriously threatens these 
residents’ self-respect.  The upshot of this argument is that the state can only act in support of 
gentrification processes if it is willing to act (in ways that are not half-hearted) to ensure that 
original residents of gentrifying areas are advantaged by these processes, in terms of their access 
to basic goods.    
The upshot of the final argument is more complicated.  This argument held that 
downstream investment by the state into gentrifying areas threatens self-respect, because it makes 
salient injustices in the society in question, with respect to the distribution of basic goods.  It is 
difficult to tease out the implications of this argument when it comes to the question of whether 
the state should permit or encourage gentrification processes.  On the one hand, we think that the 
state ought not to act in ways that threaten its citizens self-respect.  On the other, if the way in 
which gentrification processes threaten self-respect is by making salient existing injustices, there is 
																																																						
60 It might be argued that better goods come to gentrifying areas because new-comers are more persistent in 
demanding them.  This, however, is an idea often robustly rejected by original residents, who claim that their own 
demands have been “ignored”.  See, e.g. Lartey, “Nowhere for people to go.” 
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something strange about saying that the state should not permit or encourage such processes. It 
seems that we are saying that the state should be motivated by a concern to hide the injustices in 
society.61  The way out of this difficulty is to conclude that what we should take away from this 
argument is that the state should seek to ensure that all individuals have the relevant basic goods, 
and are therefore treated (in this sense) with respect.  By failing to provide these, the state makes 
original residents vulnerable to the threat to self-respect posed by gentrification processes.    
 
8. Schemmel and the conviction of one’s equal worth 
I now turn to discuss an important recent argument on the topic of self-respect from Christian 
Schemmel, which might be thought to constitute a challenge to the claims made here that state-
led gentrification can threaten self-respect. 
 Schemmel’s central claim is that liberals have reason to value “robust” self-respect.62  To 
have robust self-respect is to have the ability to maintain one’s self-respect in the face of adversity. 
Having this kind of self-respect is valuable, because it enables us to “remain convinced of [our] 
equal moral standing, and to affirm it, when others disregard it.”63 It is more valuable than the kind 
of self-respect which (as Schemmel sees it) liberals normally defend, a kind of self-respect which 
is more sensitive to our treatment by others.64 
 If we possess robust self-respect, according to Schemmel, it is not appropriate that our 
self-respect is undermined by certain kinds of disrespectful treatment.  It is only appropriate for 
us to lose self-respect when “one cannot be reasonably expected to maintain it, because conditions 
are just too unfavourable.”65  Schemmel does not offer a full account of when individuals cannot 
be reasonably expected to maintain self-respect, however, he suggests that this will often be when 
“powerful others enjoy dominance in the space of reasons on which victims can draw their self-
conception.”66 In a society in which all are convinced that women ought to be subordinate to men 
(to give a simple example) it is appropriate for women to lack self-respect.  However, in a society 
in which some individuals are disrespected, but in which those individuals have the resources to 
																																																						
61 This is why Rawls’s claim that the self-respect of the worst-off in a just Rawlsian society is protected because they 
will be part of “non-comparing” groups is thought to be so troubling.  On this see Jeanne S. Zaino, “Self-Respect 
and Rawlsian Justice,” The Journal of Politics 60:3 (1998): 737-53. 
62 Schemmel, “Real self-respect.” 
63 Ibid., 637. 
64 A yet more radical view of the relationship between self-respect and disrespectful treatment is discussed by Colin 
Bird. On this view, a proper understanding of our humanity – one which does not involve inflated views about our 
“worth” – frees our sense of self-respect “from anxiety about the acceptance of others,” breaking the link between 
self-respect and others’ treatment of us almost entirely.  Bird, “Self-Respect,” 34. However, as Schemmel points out, 
if breaking the link between self-respect and others’ treatment requires accepting this view of individual worth, liberal 
political philosophers will not be on board – and for good reasons.  For more on this see Schemmel, 640-1.   
65 Schemmel, 638. 
66 Ibid., 639. 
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shore up their self-respect, loss of self-respect is not appropriate.  So, Schemmel argues that in a 
society in which the political liberties of some are worth less because the rich have greater influence 
over the political sphere, but in which there is plenty of opportunity to protest this system, and in 
which there are people protesting it, it is not appropriate for those whose liberties have lesser 
worth to lose self-respect (although it is appropriate for them to feel disrespected).67  This example 
brings out an important claim of Schemmel’s: that it will often not be appropriate to lose self-
respect in the face of injustice if “effective” opportunities for protest, solidarity and support, and 
resistance are available.68  Having said this, however, Schemmel also argues that developing robust 
self-respect requires a particular kind of education and upbringing, one with a “special focus on 
cultivating resilience.”69  In societies in which this is not in place, then, it becomes less clear when 
it is appropriate and when it is not appropriate for individuals to lose self-respect. 
 Schemmel’s line of argument might be thought to challenge my arguments about 
gentrification and self-respect.  Gentrification processes, it might be argued, normally take place 
in a context in which there are the relevant opportunities for protest, solidarity and support, and 
resistance. There are, globally, many anti-gentrification movements, and there is considerable 
criticism of gentrification in the public sphere.  In such a context, it might be argued, citizens have 
the right kind of opportunities to shore up their self-respect in the face of the threats gentrification 
processes pose to that self-respect. 
 There are a number of responses that can be made here, none of which take issue with 
Schemmel’s main claims, but which rather reject the idea that they constitute a challenge to the 
arguments set out above. First, we can note that even though the state is only one ‘voice’ in 
discussions around gentrification, it is a particularly powerful one.70  Thus, if the state disrespects 
citizens – as I have argued it can do in the context of state-led gentrification – this is a serious 
challenge to their self-respect. 
 Second, we can reiterate that Schemmel’s claims about when it is appropriate and when it 
is not appropriate to lose self-respect hold on the assumption that individuals have been raised 
and educated with a “special focus on cultivating resilience.” Since this assumption doesn’t hold 
in the non-ideal context of the present day, we can’t draw the conclusion that it would not be 
appropriate for the original residents of gentrifying areas to lose self-respect in response to 
gentrification processes. 
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 Third, we might point out that in many contemporary societies, those who are badly off 
are already vulnerable with respect to self-respect, because of dominant narratives that stigmatize 
them and link poverty with morally undesirable qualities, such as laziness. In this context, 
therefore, we might think that original residents “cannot be reasonably expected to maintain”71 
their self-respect in the face of further disrespectful treatment, especially when that disrespectful 
treatment is being carried out by the state.  
 Finally, we might question whether original residents really have “effective” opportunities 
to protest, to form solidaristic movements, and so on. Schemmel’s understanding of “effective” 
opportunities is demanding, requiring, amongst other things, that individuals have the economic 
means to take advantage of their rights of speech and association. This seems right: if I do not 
have the material basis to take advantage of these rights, then such rights will not enable me to 
shore up my self-respect in the face of injustice.  Original residents, who lack the relevant economic 
resources, cannot be understood as having the relevant “effective” opportunities. It might also be 
added that, insofar as gentrification processes disperse communities, they further undermine 
original residents’ opportunities for solidaristic and protest movements.72  
 
9. Conclusion 
Whilst there is significant existing work on state-led gentrification from the social sciences, such 
work does not offer a well-developed normative framework with which to evaluate this 
controversial phenomenon.  The aim of the present paper has been to supply such a framework.  
I have argued that where the state “actively seeks to promote and support” gentrification processes 
that either (a) impose non-trivial costs on badly off residents of gentrifying areas, or (b) fail to 
benefit these residents in certain ways, the state threatens their self-respect.  I have also argued 
that certain kinds of downstream state investment in gentrifying areas can threaten the self-respect 
of original residents.  In making these arguments, the paper also serves to expand the small, but 
growing, literature on gentrification in normative political philosophy. 
 The arguments above do not rule out active state support for gentrification processes. 
However, they do rule out active state support for gentrification processes where the interests of 
the badly off are not protected (or promoted) in the ways specified.  
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72 Tommie Shelby, for instance, argues that for black US citizens predominantly black neighbourhoods can be 
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